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*5 POLICE PROSECUTION IN RHODE ISLAND: THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Andrew Horwitz, Esq, John R. Grasso [FNa1]
Copyright © 2006 by Andrew Horwitz, Esq, John R. Grasso
Every day in Rhode Island, police officers are practicing law without a license in both
the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal. They do so with the full stamp of approval of
the judges before whom they appear, despite the fact that the unauthorized practice of
law is a crime in Rhode Island, as it is in every other state in the country. While one can
certainly speculate about reasons why this practice has developed, there is nothing in any
published decision of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island or in any state statute that
appears to permit or justify it. And, although the vast majority of police prosecutors in
Rhode Island are dedicated and highly qualified public servants who do their jobs in good
faith and to the best of their abilities, the fact remains that it is a highly problematic
practice to allow police officers, who are not licensed attorneys, to prosecute criminal and
traffic cases. After first explaining the various ways in which police officers routinely
engage in the unauthorized practice of law in the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal,
the authors explore a few of the many reasons why this unlawful practice is simply bad
public policy.
At the outset, it is important to recognize the vital role a public prosecutor plays in
protecting the public, the defendant, and the criminal justice system as a whole. While it
may seem superficially harmless to entrust a misdemeanor or traffic prosecution to a
police officer, that delegation of responsibility completely ignores the prosecutor's vital
role. A prosecutor exercises enormous discretion -- discretion that is essentially
unreviewed and unreviewable -- in handling criminal or traffic cases. The proper exercise
of that discretion is dependent upon a number of factors, not the least of which include
legal training and ethical obligations. Indeed, the criminal justice system functions almost
entirely on a presumption that the extraordinary power of the government, as wielded
through a prosecutor, is being applied fairly and justly. This presumption is founded on
the fact that the prosecutor is an attorney who, having been licensed to practice law in
the jurisdiction, is fully trained in the law and bound by the code of legal ethics governing
attorney conduct. The licensing process also assures a prosecuting attorney has passed a
screening with respect to honor and integrity and that he or she has sworn obedience to
a code of legal ethics. The fact that a prosecuting attorney is subject to the threat of
professional discipline if he or she violates any of the relevant ethical obligations,
provides further assurance that a prosecuting attorney will faithfully execute the duties of
his or her office in a fair and just fashion. When the person who prosecutes a criminal or
traffic case is not a licensed attorney, none of these protections or assurances is in place,
and the legal presumption that prosecutorial discretion is being exercised fairly is entirely
unfounded.
The following points detail some of the many reasons why, even if one were to
assume that a prosecuting police officer were as legally competent as a prosecuting
attorney and as obedient to all of a prosecuting attorney's ethical requirements, several
troubling issues still remain. In Rhode Island, we elect an Attorney General to carry out
the prosecutorial function for the State. As our duly elected public prosecutor, he or she
is charged with the responsibility of prioritizing the use of prosecution resources and

determining fairness on an individualized basis. Ultimately, he or she is answerable to the
electorate. The public prosecutor's failure to perform these roles, either directly or
through his or her staff, constitutes an entirely unjustified delegation to an individual
police department that is not directly accountable in any fashion. Moreover, there are
problems in terms of the appearance of justice in courts in which police officers serve as
prosecutors. When a prosecuting attorney fails to appear to prosecute a criminal case,
the message conveyed is the case is not of any particular importance -- certainly not the
message our criminal justice system ought to be conveying. By failing to distinguish
between the functions of the police department and the functions of a prosecutor's office,
the practice suggests the existence of an unsupervised police state. In addition, allowing
a layperson to practice law, an act that is illegal in every state in the country, the practice
condones illegality at the same time that it purports to be enforcing the law.

Daily Practice in the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal
On any given morning in the Rhode Island District Court, dozens and sometimes
hundreds of criminal defendants are arraigned on criminal charges. In each of those
cases, the defendant is arraigned on a criminal complaint that has been drafted by a
police officer, not by a licensed attorney. [FN1] Prior to the arraignment, particularly in
misdemeanor cases, there is typically some conversation or negotiation that takes place
between the prosecuting police officer and the defendant's lawyer or, much more
frequently, the unrepresented defendant. At the arraignment, the government is
represented by a police officer, not a licensed attorney, and in the case of misdemeanor
offenses, the case is frequently resolved with some sort of a plea. The Court will generally
ask the police prosecutor for a sentencing recommendation or, if the case is not resolved,
for *6 a recommendation with respect to bail. Those recommendations are made without
any input from a licensed attorney. If a misdemeanor case is not resolved, it is scheduled
for a pre-trial conference date. On that date, depending upon the city or town
prosecuting the case, it is quite likely that the government will once again be represented
in the negotiation phase and before the Court by a police prosecutor who is not licensed
to practice law. In some settings, that representation occurs under some form of
supervision by a licensed attorney, but frequently that is not the case. In many cities and
towns, a licensed attorney will review the case if, and only if, the case is scheduled for
trial. Under current practice in District Court, police prosecutors who are not duly licensed
to practice law are not permitted to represent the government at trial.
The situation is similar at the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal, with the notable
exception of what occurs at the trial stage. As in District Court, the case is initiated with a
summons drafted by a police officer who is not licensed to practice law. The government
is represented by a police officer at the arraignment stage, not only for purposes of
appearing before the court, but also for purposes of negotiating dispositions with
unrepresented defendants and with defense counsel. If the case is passed for trial, with
the exception of chemical test refusal cases, which are prosecuted at trial by the
Department of the Attorney General, the government will be represented by the
individual police officer who wrote the summons. That officer will generally be permitted
not only to testify, but also to cross-examine defense witnesses, make arguments to the
court, and make sentencing recommendations if a charge is sustained. If, as frequently
occurs, the defendant is not represented by counsel, the trial proceeds and concludes
without a licensed attorney ever having looked at the case.

What Constitutes the Unauthorized Practice of Law
As the Supreme Court of Rhode Island noted in 1935 “[that] the practice of law is a
special field reserved to lawyers duly licensed by the court, no one denies.” [FN2]
Although “the definition of the practice of law and the determination concerning who may
practice law is exclusively within the province” of the Supreme Court,

legislature clearly has the power to “declare acts of unauthorized practice of law illegal
and punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.” [FN4] In General Laws Title 11,
Chapter 27, the legislature has done just that. Rhode Island General Laws § 11-27-5
provides that “No person, except a duly admitted member of the bar of this state, whose
authority as a member to practice law is in full force and effect, shall practice law in this
state.” [FN5] For purposes of enforcing that statute, General Laws § 11-27-2 provides a
statutory definition of the practice of law; that definition includes “the preparation of
pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other proceeding of any kind
before or to be brought before the court,” [FN6] “acting as a representative or on behalf
of another person to commence, settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or
criminal case,” [FN7] and acting as a “representative of another person before any
court.” [FN8] Rhode Island General Laws § 11-27-14 provides the penalty provision for
any violation of the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, permitting a
sentence of up to one year in prison for a first offense and making a second offense a
felony. [FN9]
*7 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island maintains a separate and distinct authority to
enforce the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law and, for purposes of
enforcement, the Court has set out its own definition of the practice of law. Although it
has stated that the practice of law “is difficult to define,” [FN10] the Court has adopted
the following language from the Supreme Court of South Carolina: “‘It is too obvious for
discussion that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts.
According to the generally understood definition of the practice of law in this country, it
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, and the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, ... and, in general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law.”’ [FN11] Additionally, in 1983, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island published guidelines for the use of legal assistants that help
elucidate its perspective on what does and does not constitute the practice of law. [FN12]
As a general matter, these guidelines prohibit the delegation to a non-attorney of
“[s]ervices requiring the exercise of independent professional legal judgment.” [FN13]
Clearly, drafting a charging instrument and submitting that charging instrument to a
court each constitute a violation of General Laws § 11-27-5. The drafting process involves
“the preparation of pleadings or other legal papers incident to any action or other
proceeding of any kind before or to be brought before the court,” an act that is squarely
within the statutory definition of the practice of law contained in General Laws § 11-272(1). Once the charging instrument is submitted to the court, the person doing so has
commenced the case, an act that General Laws § 11-27-2(3) explicitly defines as the
practice of law. Similarly, the Supreme Court's definition of the practice of law includes
“the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings ... before judges and courts.” [FN14] Presumably, for that reason, in its
guidelines for the use of legal assistants the Supreme Court requires all legal documents
be “reviewed by a lawyer before being submitted to a client or another party.” [FN15]
The charging instrument used in the arraignment of a criminal or traffic case, much
like the complaint in a civil action, is a pivotal document that can determine the entire
nature of the following proceedings. As one noted criminal law professor has observed,
“our system is one in which guilty pleas routinely follow a charge and, therefore, the
decision to charge is, in many cases, tantamount to conviction.” [FN16] Consequently,
and particularly because of the many intricate legal questions within the charging
decision, it *9 makes perfect sense to require the charging instrument be drafted, or at
least approved, by a person who is licensed to practice law. At a bare minimum, the
decision to charge, and what offense or offenses to charge, involves a detailed knowledge
of the elements of the available offenses and any potential defenses to those offenses.
Moreover, because an offense should not be charged unless there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause and sufficient admissible evidence to support a
conviction, [FN17] the charging decision, reflected in the drafting and submission of a

charging instrument, plainly requires “the exercise of independent professional legal
judgment” that the Supreme Court says is solely a lawyer's job. [FN18]
As clear as it is that the drafting and submission of the charging instrument
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, the law, representing the government's
interests in a plea negotiation, is that much clearer. General Laws § 11-27-2(3) explicitly
provides that “acting as a representative or on behalf of another person to commence,
settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or criminal case” constitutes the
practice of law. This is, of course, as it should be. As the Supreme Court of South
Carolina opined recently, “The non-attorney's negotiation of guilty pleas with defendants
and defense counsel clearly crosses the line into the unauthorized practice of law. Plea
negotiations require the training, skill and accountability of an attorney.” [FN19]
When the plea negotiation takes place with the unrepresented defendant, as is most
often the case in the District Court arraignment courtroom and almost exclusively the
case in the Traffic Tribunal, another aspect of the practice of law comes into play: the
provision of legal advice. While it may be theoretically possible to engage in a plea
negotiation without offering legal advice, it is virtually impossible to imagine. Any effort
on the part of the police prosecutor to discuss the evidence in the case, the likelihood of
conviction, and possible sentencing consequences of a conviction after trial or the wisdom
of entering a plea, must fairly be characterized as the giving of legal advice. [FN20]
Because General Laws § 11-27-2(2) defines the provision of “any advice or counsel
pertaining to a law question or a court action or judicial proceeding” as the practice of
law, a police officer engaged in the negotiation of a criminal or traffic charge will
invariably be practicing law.
When a police officer appears in open court as the government's representative,
whether for the purpose of resolving a case or simply for the purpose of arraigning a
defendant on a new charge, that police officer is engaged in the practice of law. The
statutory definition of the practice of law includes acting as a “representative of another
person before any court” [FN21] and “acting as a representative or on behalf of another
person to commence, settle, compromise, adjust, or dispose of any civil or criminal case.”
[FN22] Each of these things happens at every single arraignment in the District Court and
at the Traffic Tribunal. The Supreme Court's definition of the practice of law encompasses
“the management of ... actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts.” [FN23] Making plea offers, presenting facts, and making recommendations with
respect to sentencing and to bail, are all part and parcel of the police prosecutor's daily
activities in the District Court. At those times, the Court calls upon the police prosecutor
to make legal arguments. Each of these activities falls squarely within any reasonable
definition of “management” of the case before the court.
Rule 6(a) of the Traffic Tribunal Rules of Procedure, which governs the arraignment
stage, provides the “police department which charged the summons shall be represented
by a prosecution officer.” Because these rules are subject to the approval of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, one might wonder whether the Court has somehow authorized
police officers, who are not licensed to practice law, to engage in these various activities.
In fact, such a conclusion seems very *29 much at odds with the court's recent case law.
The Traffic Tribunal rules offer no definition whatsoever of the term “prosecution officer,”
so it is not at all clear the term refers to a police officer who is not licensed to practice
law. Similarly, the rules offer no description of the specific tasks that may or may not be
undertaken by a “prosecution officer.” Nothing in the requirement that the charging
police department be “represented” by a “prosecution officer” inherently means that a
police officer, who is not licensed to practice law, is suddenly permitted to engage in
charging decisions, plea negotiations, and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Nor,
does the requirement that a “prosecution officer” represent the charging department
inherently mean that such a person must exclusively represent the department. Indeed,
nothing in the rules suggests that charging decisions, plea negotiations, and the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion cannot, and should not, be reserved for attorneys duly licensed
to practice law.

When the Supreme Court first upheld the Constitutional validity of the precursor to
General Laws Title 11, Chapter 27, it explicitly confirmed the Legislature's power to
criminalize acts that the Legislature defines as the unauthorized practice of law. In
Creditors' Service Corp. v. Cummings, [FN24] the Court recognized the Legislature
“has the inherent power to prohibit and punish any act as a crime, provided that in
exercising such power it does not violate any provision of the Federal or State
Constitution .... If the statute is within the power of the Legislature to enact, it is the duty
of the court to sustain it, irrespective of its own opinion of the wisdom, reasonableness,
or necessity for the statute.” [FN25] Thus, while the Legislature clearly “has no power to
pass a law granting the right to any one to practice law,” the Court noted the Legislature
does have the power to “enact a statute designed to protect the public against
imposition, incompetency, and dishonesty.” [FN26]
Much more recently, in 2002, the Court reasserted its strong support for the
Legislature's independent right to protect the public against the unauthorized practice of
law. In In re Rule Amendments to Rules 5.4(a) and 7.2(c) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, [FN27] the Court considered and rejected a proposed rule
change that would have conflicted with portions of the Legislature's unauthorized practice
statute. Although General Laws § 8-6-2(a) explicitly provides that rules adopted by the
Supreme Court “shall supersede any statutory regulation in conflict therewith,” the Court
expressed, in no uncertain terms, its reluctance to create such a conflict with the
unauthorized practice statute: “As a matter of comity, we believe this Court should avoid
enacting rules that would conflict with the Legislature's policy determinations in this
area.” [FN28] Although not a single party testified against the proposed rule changes,
which had been put forward by the Ethics Advisory Panel and supported by the Rhode
Island Bar Association, the Court ultimately rejected the proposal because adopting it
would have put the Court rules “at variance with the public policy of the General
Assembly and condone [d] conduct [that has been] declared to be criminal by the
General Assembly.” [FN29] In light of this vigorous protection of the Legislature's efforts
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law, it seems hard to imagine that by approving
just one sentence in Traffic Tribunal Rule 6(a) -- and a highly ambiguous sentence
containing undefined terms at that -- the Court intended to completely undermine
General Laws § 11-27-5.
Whatever limited protection Rule *30 6(a) may arguably provide to a prosecuting
police officer at the arraignment stage at the Traffic Tribunal, there is certainly no parallel
rule concerning the arraignment stage in the District Court. And even at the Traffic
Tribunal, the rule is limited by its terms to the arraignment stage. When a police officer
prosecutes a Traffic Tribunal case at trial, which is generally the case unless the
defendant is charged with refusing a chemical test, the unauthorized practice of law is too
transparent to require significant exploration. Beyond the practice issues previously
described and inherent in representing the government in open court, no plausible
definition of the practice of law could exclude cross-examining witnesses and making
legal arguments to the court.

Why Police Prosecution Should Be Prohibited [FN30]
A prosecutor in the American legal system is vested with an enormous amount of
discretion in the handling of a criminal case. In the vast majority of situations, that
discretion is exercised at early stages in a prosecution in ways that cannot and will not
ever be reviewed, either by the judiciary or by anyone else. Most obviously, the basic
decision to charge a person with a crime and the secondary decision of what charge or
charges to file are almost entirely beyond any form of review. Any of a multitude of pretrial decisions, including bail requests, discovery, and plea negotiations, are similarly
outside the scope of any effective review. The United States Supreme Court has noted
that most prosecutorial decisions do not lend themselves readily to judicial review and,
except for some very narrow exceptions, should remain beyond the scope of judicial

review for broader policy reasons. [FN31] Consequently, the criminal justice system
functions largely on a tremendous leap of faith that those who wield the government's
prosecutorial power will wield it in a fair and just fashion. In large part, this leap of faith
is justified by the prosecutor's legal training, by the prosecutor's oath of obedience to a
binding code of legal ethics, and by the fact that the prosecutor, at least on the state
level, is an elected official who is expected to be responsive to the electorate.
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court made explicit the general rule that courts
had consistently followed for years when issues had arisen concerning the prosecution of
a criminal case: that prosecutors' decisions are supported by a *31 “‘presumption of
regularity”’ such that “‘in the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, courts
[should] presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”’ [FN32] In that
case, which involved a claim of selective prosecution, the Court stressed the need for
broad judicial deference to prosecutorial judgments. Because it wished to avoid judicial
interference with the proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Court held that a
defendant must present clear evidence of a violation “[i]n order to dispel the presumption
that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection.” [FN33] Simple logic suggests that a
presumption of regularity cannot apply when there is no assurance the prosecutor has
ever expressed the willingness and ability to abide by ethical rules, or that the prosecutor
has any legal training or competence whatsoever.
Because our entire legal system is designed around the presumption of regularity, it
is critically important that only those licensed to practice law are permitted to exercise
the vast powers of the prosecutor. While it may well be that many police officers perform
the prosecutorial function both ethically and effectively, this misses the point that there
must be clear and consistent guidelines in place to protect the public, the defendant, and
the very integrity of the system. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has made this point
on more than one occasion: “To safeguard the practice of law, which touches so
intimately the administration of justice, and to promote the welfare of the people, whose
ministers we are, this Court has ordained certain standards of character and education as
a prerequisite to admission to the bar. These standards are high, as indeed they ought to
be, and there is constant pressure to elevate them still higher, all to the end that the
people may be assured the best possible service in the dispatch of their legal business.”
[FN34] The Court adheres to these standards because, it has noted, “Great and
irreparable injury can come to the people, and the proper administration of justice can be
prevented, by the unwarranted intrusion of unauthorized and unskilled persons into the
practice of law.” [FN35]
Because the prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law has been justified largely
in terms of protecting the putative client and society at large from the unscrupulous or
incompetent practitioner, the fact that an individual police prosecutor may be acting in an
ethical and competent*32 fashion is largely beside the point. The general prohibition
should hold for the greater good of society. It is hard to imagine a context in which more
harm might be done to an individual or to society as a whole than to entrust the
enormous power of the criminal justice system to one who is engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law; consequently, it is hard to imagine a context in which the
general prohibition should be more rigorously enforced.
One fundamental characteristic of the American system of justice is that both the
public and the accused are entitled to the fair and prudent exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. As the commentary to the American Bar Association's Prosecution Function
Standards notes “The character, quality and efficiency of the whole system is shaped in
great measure by the manner in which the prosecutor exercises his or her broad
discretionary powers.” [FN36] The fair and prudent exercise of prosecutorial discretion
turns, in large part, on obedience to an attorney's code of legal ethics. If the person
acting as prosecutor is making discretionary decisions without the guidance and
restrictions provided by an attorney's ethical rules, both the public and the accused are
deprived of the fair exercise of discretion that an attorney would provide and that the law
commands.

On a very basic level, both the public and the accused rely heavily on the fact that, as
the United States Supreme Court has noted, “It is as much [a prosecutor's] duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” [FN37] In a wide variety of settings,
beginning with the decision to charge and including pre-trial discovery, plea negotiations,
and trial, the public and the accused are forced to rely quite heavily on the ethical
obligations on a prosecutor to seek “justice,” not just a desired end result. [FN38]
Exculpatory evidence in the hands of a prosecutor will generally find its way to a criminal
defendant if, and only if, the prosecutor obeys his or her ethical and constitutional duties
in the face of any number of competing interests. A plea negotiation is founded upon the
fact that the defense can rely on factual representations made by a prosecutor who is
faithful to his or her constitutionally and ethically prescribed role in the face of any
number of competing interests. In each of these areas, and in countless others
throughout the criminal process, *33 both the public and a defendant must rely on the
good faith of the prosecutor to protect his or her rights. Any notion that a judge is
capable of monitoring the prosecutor's conduct in order to ensure that no ethical or
constitutional violations occur is both inconsistent with the conclusion reached by the
United States Supreme Court [FN39] and simply incorrect.
Because the charging decision is the “part of the prosecutor's discretion which carries
with it the greatest potential for misuse,” [FN40] the reliance on a police prosecutor at
that stage of a prosecution is particularly inappropriate. As a general matter, a
prosecutor's natural inclination, exacerbated when left unchecked by any obligation to an
ethical code or any prospect of sanction for doing so, is to overcharge. The police
prosecutor will generally feel more protected by overcharging, as the cost of any error
will be borne by the criminal defendant. However, it is clear that a police prosecutor is
much more likely to be subject to certain kinds of institutional biases than a prosecuting
attorney. In any number of cases, the arresting officer may be in some jeopardy
concerning allegations of police brutality, false arrest, or various other violations of an
individual's rights. One way of providing greater protection for the arresting officer is for
a fellow officer -- the police prosecutor -- to ensure criminal charges are filed, because a
case that never makes it through the charging stage puts the officer in a much worse
posture in terms of civil or criminal litigation. If a prosecuting officer recognizes that
some evidence was gathered in an illegal fashion, there is an enormous disincentive for
the officer to acknowledge the illegality, particularly if doing so means refusing to file
charges. Not only would the prosecuting officer risk engendering tremendous resentment
from an officer upon whom he or she is likely to have to rely in the future, but the
prosecuting officer also risks setting up a colleague for the possibility of internal review or
potential litigation. This sort of behavior violates what has frequently been described as
one of the central maxims of police culture: protect your fellow officers at all costs.
[FN41] The far easier path for the police prosecutor is to charge the individual and then
use the prosecutorial power to resolve the case quickly.
Yet another form of bias arises when the victim of the alleged crime is a police officer
or the police department. When an officer arrests someone for assaulting him or her or
resisting arrest, a fellow police officer asked to prosecute the case is not likely to view it
in the same fashion as an attorney without any personal connection to the case. While a
prosecuting attorney must recuse himself or herself from a case in which he or she has a
conflict of interest, a police prosecutor is not *34 bound by any similar rule.
Of course, it is also possible that these same sorts of biases can cut in the opposite
direction, leaving society poorly protected when a case is either not charged at all or is
seriously undercharged. Whether caused by the urge to protect a fellow police officer, an
effort to avoid litigation that might expose unseemly or unlawful police practices, or an
effort to preserve a city's crime statistics by underreporting serious criminal activity, the
absence of any ethical parameters around these vital prosecutorial decisions leaves the
public in jeopardy.
In the final analysis, even if one were to assume that a prosecuting police officer were
as legally competent as a prosecuting attorney and as obedient to all of a prosecuting

attorney's ethical requirements, the practice of police prosecution is simply bad public
policy. Allowing a case to be prosecuted by a person who is neither licensed to practice
law nor bound by any specific code of ethical behavior certainly serves to undermine the
appearance of fairness in the operation of our system of justice. The situation is that
much worse when the unlicensed prosecutor is a member of the arresting police
department. Forcing a person who has been arrested by a particular police department to
rely on a member of that same department to exercise prosecutorial discretion, evaluate
the legality of the police actions in the case, evaluate the legal strength of the
prosecution's case, evaluate the worth of the case in terms of its deterrent value, provide
the accused with exculpatory evidence, and, in the Traffic Tribunal, even try the case,
would certainly cause most defendants to question the fundamental integrity of the
proceedings.
It might be tempting for some to justify the practice on economic grounds,
suggesting that what transpires in the District Court and the Traffic Tribunal is not that
important. Those who would take such an approach grossly underestimate two significant
factors. First, they underestimate the significance of a criminal prosecution. Even if the
underlying offense is perceived as relatively trivial, a criminal conviction can, in certain
circumstances, cost a person a job, an apartment in public housing, a professional
license, a driver's license, the right to remain in the United States and, of course,
freedom from incarceration. Second, they underestimate the significance of the public's
perception of our justice system. The District Court and the Traffic Tribunal, in which the
practice of police prosecution is prevalent, are the primary point of contact, if not the
only point of contact, most citizens ever have with the system. For just this reason,
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the late Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
repeatedly expressed the viewpoint that the lower courts are the “most important” courts
in the state. [FN42]
While any instance in which the public is left unprotected against the unauthorized
practice of law is certainly cause for concern, it is that much worse when the unlicensed
practitioner purports to actually represent the public through his or her unlawful activity.
Condoning illegal activity conducted in the name of the state is hard to justify under any
circumstances, but even more so when the state is engaged in the process of attempting
to enforce and engender respect for the law. In the most obvious sense, the prosecution
of a criminal case in a fashion that involves unlawful action by the state engenders
tremendous disrespect for the law. The words of the great Supreme Court Justice Louis
D. Brandeis ring just as true today as when he wrote them in 1928:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials *35 shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means -- to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal -- would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its
face. [FN43]
[FNa1]. Andrew Horwitz is a Professor of Law and the Director of Clinical Programs at
Roger Williams University School of Law. John R. Grasso is a former police officer with the
Cranston Police Department and a third year law student at Roger Williams University
School of Law.
[FN1]. There are some situations in which the police officer who drafts the complaint or
who appears in court as a police prosecutor is also an attorney duly licensed to practice
law in Rhode Island. This article is intended to address the more typical situation in which
that is not the case.
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